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A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated
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Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff
JAKUB DARGAJ, University of Copenhagen
JAKOB GRUE SIMONSEN, University of Copenhagen
It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses,
but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Pris-
oner’s dilemma), or for classes of games satisfying certain conditions not known to be both necessary and
sufficient.
We derive a complete characterization in the form of simple necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of a computable strategy without a computable best response under limit-of-means payoff. We
further refine the characterization by requiring the strategy profiles to be Nash equilibria or subgame-perfect
equilibria, and we show how the characterizations entail that it is efficiently decidable whether an infinitely
repeated game has a computable strategy without a computable best response.
1 INTRODUCTION
We consider two-player gamesG with simultaneous moves and perfect information. In a repeated
game (or supergame),G is played repeatedly with all players aware of all moves played by all play-
ers in all previous games. The payoff of each player in such a game is a function of the payoffs
obtained in the repetitions of G , for example the limit-of-means payoff is the limit inferior of the
undiscounted averages of the payoff for each finite sequence of repetitions. A computable strategy
for infinitely repeated games is one where an algorithm computes the next action based on the fi-
nite history of previous repetitions of the game. Classic results from the 1990s show that infinitely
repeated games admit computable strategies that have a best response, but no computable best
response [15, 18], that is, some algorithm will play a strategy such that there will exist a counter-
strategy for the other player that will achieve maximum payoff among all strategies, but no such
counterstrategy is computable. For infinitely repeated games with limit-of-means payoff, results
are known solely for Prisoner’s dilemma, and the computable strategy involved is not known to
be a Nash equilibrium [15]; for rational players, the absence of an equilibrium presents a problem:
an algorithm might prevent other algorithms from obtaining maximal payoff, but possibly at the
cost of not obtaining maximal payoff for itself. For infinitely repeated games with discounted pay-
off, results are known for a larger class of games containing Prisoner’s dilemma that will ensure
that the strategies involved form Nash or subgame-perfect equilibria [18], but no necessary and
sufficient conditions are known.
Computable here means “computable by a Turing machine”—the most general and widely ac-
cepted notion of what it means for a mathematical function to be computable [14, 22, 25]. A Tur-
ing machine is an idealized notion of a computer that has a finite control (that is, a “program”),
but potentially limitless memory. Standard notions of restricted machines can typically be seen as
Turingmachines with restrictions on their running time or memory use (e.g., finite-state machines
are Turing machines with constant memory). As a strategy in an infinitely repeated game is map
s that, for any finite history (i.e., the finite sequence of previous actions played by both players
in prior repetitions of G) outputs an action to be played in the next repetition, the strategy s is
computable if there exists a Turing machine that computes the map. Thus, a computable strategy
s that has a best response, but no computable best response, is a strategy played by some (ordi-
nary, finite) algorithm that when played against any adversary that also plays according to some
Unpublished draft manuscript. An extended abstract summarizing the results of the manuscript will appear at EC âĂŹ20.
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algorithm–that the adversary may choose freely–results in strictly suboptimal payoff for the ad-
versary. However, as s has a best response, an adversary with the ability to play a non-computable
strategy–that is, a strategy that requires fundamentally more power to “compute” than what our
current understanding of the term “computer” is able to–could, in principle, obtain optimal payoff.
Contributions: For infinitely repeated games with limit of means payoff, we extend previous
results in two directions: First, we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for games to have
computable strategies that have no computable best response, even though a best response ex-
ists; as a consequence of our techniques, we also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for
strategies (computable or otherwise) to have no best response at all. Second, we obtain necessary
and sufficient conditions for games to have such strategies in the case where the only strategies
allowed are those that form Nash equilibrium, respectively a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In both
cases, it is efficiently decidable whether a game satisfies the conditions
The general approach in our proof follows a standard technique in repeated games, namely
using trigger strategies that test for deviation from a prescribed path of play, entering a (finite or
infinite) punishment phase ensured to decrease the opposing player’s payoff and thus discouraging
deviations from the prescribed path of play. All strategies use the notion of recursively inseparable
sets, already utilized by Nachbar and Zame for discounted games [18].
Both results [15, 18] make use of specific moves whose existence is guaranteed by the assump-
tion that the game is (a variation of) the Prisoner’s dilemma. The two key new insights are (i) that
we can employ playersâĂŹ minmax payoff inG in punishment phases to replace cooperation and
defection from Prisoner’s dilemma in almost all games, and (ii) that to establish an equilibrium,
we can modify the strategies from the Folk theorems (standard results describing the set of equi-
librium payoffs) by carefully incorporating the recursively inseparable sets in some repetitions
of the game. Previously, strategies were either not required to form an equilibrium [15], or used
predefined moves (cooperation and defection) on the prescribed path [18], while our strategies do
not rely on these moves–instead, their existence is guaranteed by the Folk theorems.
The notion ofminmax payoff plays an important role in the characterizations obtained. Consider
a class of trivial games where a player cannot earn more than their minmax. Then it is rather
apparent that a computable strategy played by any player has a computable best response in an
infinitely repeated game. Surprisingly, it turns out that any game, in order to have a computable
strategy with no computable best response, just needs to allow a player to earn strictly more than
their minmax; using different variations of strategies allow us to, essentially, use this criterion to
also treat Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria.
1.1 Related work
Knoblauch proved, for limit-of-means payoff, that the Prisoner’s dilemma admitted computable
strategies that have a best response, but no computable best response [15], a result later improved
by Fortnow and Whang [10] showing that there is a polynomial-time computable strategy in Pris-
oner’s dilemma that has no eventually ϵ-optimal computable response for any ϵ > 0. Similarly,
Nachbar and Zame show that for discounted payoff, there are computable strategies with best re-
sponses where no best response is computable for a class of two-player games that are paradoxical
in the same way as the PrisonerâĂŹs dilemma–rational players earn less than if they were both
forced to make an irrational decision [18]. Unlike previous results for limit-of-means payoff, the
strategies in [18] strategy are required to be subgame-perfect equilibria, and the conditions for ex-
istence of strategies without computable best responses are sufficient, but the authors conjecture
that they are not necessary.
Both prior to, and after, the landmark results of Knoblauch and Nachbar and Zame, substantial
work has been devoted to computing best responses (or Nash equilibria) for repeated games where
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strategies are constrained to be computable by machines with less power than the full Turing ma-
chines. Classic work includes Rubinstein [23], Gilboa [12], Ben-Porath [4], and Neyman andOkada
[19] (finite automata); Fortnow andWhang [10] (polynomial-time computable strategies). Modern
results have mostly concerned variations on the notion of equilibria or asymmetry between play-
ers, for example Chen et al. consider strategies with strictly bounded memories (a setting slightly
different from strategies computable by finite automata) [8], and Zuo and Tang [27] study Stack-
elberg equilibria in a setting with restricted machines, and Chen et al. [9] study changes to Nash
equilibria of infinitely repeated games under restrictions on the running time or space of the Tur-
ing machines. For games with discounted payoff, [5] prove that all subgame-perfect equilibrium
paths consist of elementary subpaths that can be represented as directed graphs.
Similar results concerning notions different from strategies that are known to exist classically,
but fail to be computable exist elsewhere in Economics; for example, Richter and Wong show
that there are exchange economies with all components computable and where a competitive
equilibrium exists (by the Arrow-Debreu Theorem [1]), but no such equilibrium is computable
[21].
2 PRELIMINARIES
We expect the reader to be familiar with basic notions from game theory and computability the-
ory at the level of introductory textbooks (e.g., [11, 17, 20, 25]). To keep the paper self-contained,
we recap notation and some fundamental results in the following. Even though we are primarily
interested in two-player games, we give definitions for games with any finite number of players
in order to conform to standard notation. We set N = {1, 2, . . .}, N0 = {0} ∪N, and we denote the
set of rational numbers by Q as usual.
2.1 Game theory
Definition 2.1 (Normal-form game). A (normal-form) game is a tuple
(N ,A,u) where:
(1) N = {1, . . . ,n} is the set of players (typically referred to as P1, . . . , Pn).
(2) A = A1 × · · · × An is the set of action profiles, where Ai is a finite set of actions available to
Pi.
(3) u = (u1, . . . ,un), where ui : A→ Q is the payoff (aka. utility or reward) function for Pi.
We shall mostly be interested in games (N ,A,u) with two players, that is, N = {P1, P2}. For
two-player games, the payoff function u can be represented as a matrix with rows indexed by the
actions available to P1 (A1), columns by A2, and entries containing payoffs for each player when
the corresponding action profile is played, separated by commas. This matrix is called a payoff
matrix.
We use the classic Prisoner’s dilemma as a running example:
Example 2.2 (Prisoner’s dilemma). Let a,b, c,d ∈ R satisfy c > a > d > b. Prisoner’s dilemma is
a two-player game with A1 = A2 = {C,D} and the following payoff matrix:
C D
C a, a b, c
D c, b d, d
Definition 2.3 (Pareto domination). LetG = (N ,A,u) be a normal-form game. Action profile a is
said to Pareto dominate action profile a′ if (i) For all i ∈ N , ui (a) ≥ ui (a′), and (ii) there is i ∈ N
such that ui (a) > ui (a′). If, for all i ∈ N , we have ui (a) > ui (a′), we say that a strictly Pareto
dominates a′.
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For example, in Prisoner’s dilemma the action profile (C,C) strictly Pareto dominates (D,D).
This follows from the initial assumption that for both players i , ui (C,C) = a > d = ui (D,D).
Definition 2.4. For an action profile a = (a1, . . . ,an) and Pi, we denote by a−i the tuple of actions
of all other players, that is (a1, . . . ,ai−1,ai+1, . . . ,an).
Definition 2.5 (Best response; Nash equilibrium). LetG = (N ,A,u) be a game, leta = (a1, . . . ,an) ∈
A be an action profile, and let a∗i ∈ Ai be an action of Pi. We say that a∗i is a best response to a−i
if ui (a∗i ,a−i ) ≥ ui (a′i ,a−i ) for any other action a′i ∈ Ai . We say that a is a Nash equilibrium ofG if,
for all i ∈ N , ai is a best response to a−i .
2.2 Repeated games
We now consider a situation when the same game is played infinitely many times; standard treat-
ments of such games can be found in [2, 11], and we recapitulate basic terminology here.
Definition 2.6 (Infinitely repeated game). Given a game G = (N ,A,u), G∞ is a game which con-
sists of infinitely many repetitions of the game G . G is called the stage game of the infinitely
repeated gameG∞.
Next we define a finite history of lengthT ∈ N as a sequence of the firstT action profiles played
in G∞ and a path of play as infinite sequence of action profiles.
Definition 2.7 (Finite history). Let G∞ be the infinitely repeated game of the stage game G =
(N ,A,u). For a T ∈ N0, we shall write HTG∞ = A × · · · × A = AT , and HG∞ =
⋃
T ≥0HTG∞ . A finite
history of length T is any hT ∈ HTG∞ .
Definition 2.8 (Path of play). Let G∞ be the infinitely repeated game of the stage game G =
(N ,A,u). We write H∞G∞ = A ×A × · · · = A∞. A path of play is any h∞ ∈ H∞G∞ .
For a finite history hT ∈ HTG∞ and t ∈ N, t ≤ T , we write hTi [t] to denote the action played by
Player i in repetition t . Similarly, for a path of playh∞,h∞i [t] is the action played by Pi in repetition
t . We denote by u¯i [t] = ui (h∞[t]) the payoff of Pi in repetition t .
For example, let the stage game G be Prisoner’s dilemma from Example 2.2 and consider the
infinitely repeated game G∞. Since in every stage there are four action profiles available, there
exist 4T histories of length T . Assume that both players decide to play C in odd stages and D in
even stages. This leads to the path of play h∞ = ((C,C), (D,D), (C,C), (D,D), . . . ) and both players
obtain the sequence of payoffs (a,d,a,d, . . . ).
The payoff function for G∞ can be defined in multiple ways; in the present paper, we consider
only the limit-of-means payoff (aka. average payoff):
Definition 2.9 (Limit-of-means payoff). Given an infinite sequence of payoffs (u¯i [1], u¯i [2], . . . )
for Pi, the limit-of-means payoff of Pi is defined as:
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
u¯i [t].
Thus, if G = (N ,A,U ), then any path of play of G∞ induces a limit-of-means payoff for each
player. In games with limit-of-means payoff, the use of lim inf ensures that any finite sequence of
payoffs is ignored, so players seeking to maximize their payoffwill only care about their behaviour
in the infinite horizon.
The action played by a player in the stage t+1 depends on the history of length t . All players have
complete information about the actions played before, so a player’s strategy maps finite histories
into actions played in the next stage:
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Definition 2.10 (Strategy in a repeated game). Let G = (N ,A,u) be a game. A (pure) strategy for
Pi in G∞ is a map si : HG∞ → Ai . A strategy profile in G∞ is a tuple s = (s1, . . . , sn) where, for
each i ∈ N , si is a strategy for Pi.
Observe that any strategy profile s defines a unique path of play h∞s , namely the one where
each player in stage t ∈ N of G∞ observes the finite history consisting of actions played by all
players in stages 1, . . . , t − 1, and then use their strategy to play an action for stage t . If s =
(s1, . . . , si−1, si , si+1, . . . , sn) is a strategy profile and s ′i is a strategy for Pi, we write (s ′i , s−i ) for the
strategy profile obtained by replacing si by s ′i .
Definition 2.11 (Payoff of a strategy profile). Let G = (N ,A,u) be a game, let s = (s1, . . . , sn) be
a strategy profile in G∞, and let h∞s be the unique path of play induced by s . The (limit-of-means)
payoff of Pi is:
υi (s) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
ui (h∞s [t])
Definition 2.12 (Best response; Nash equilibrium). LetG = (N ,A,u) be a game, let s = (s1, . . . , sn)
be a strategy profile in G∞, and let s∗i be a strategy for Pi in G
∞. We say that s∗i is a best response
to s−i if υi
(
s∗i , s−i
) ≥ υ1(s ′i , s−i ) for any other strategy s ′i for Pi. We say that s is a Nash equilibrium
if, for all i ∈ N , si is a best response to s−i .
For a two-player game and a strategy profile s = (s1, s2) we abuse notation slightly by writing
that s1 is a best response to s2 instead of a best response to s−1 = (s2). Observe that no player can
unilaterally choose an action (or strategy) that yields them a strictly better payoff than a Nash
equilibrium–any strictly better payoff must involve other players changing strategies as well.
Definition 2.13 (Subgame). Let G∞ be an infinitely repeated game, T ∈ N and hT ∈ HTG∞ . The
subgame (G∞,hT ) is the infinitely repeated game starting at stage T + 1 ofG∞ with history hT .
To illustrate the notion of a subgame, consider aG∞ and a strategy profile s inducing the path of
play h∞s . If the history hT is a restriction of h∞s to the first T stages, then s applied to the subgame
(G∞,hT ) leads to the path of playh∞s [T+1, . . . ], whereh∞s [T+1, . . . ] is the contiguous subsequence
of h∞s starting at stage T + 1. On the other hand, there may be histories containing actions that,
according to s , are never played by any of the players. Every such history hT
′
defines a different
subgame, and leads to a path of play that may have nothing in common with the original h∞s .
Definition 2.14 (Subgame-perfect equilibrium). LetG∞ be an infinitely repeated game. A strategy
profile s is said to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium of G∞ if it is a Nash equilibrium of every
subgame.
2.3 Computability theory
As usual, for any A ⊆ N we say that A is recursively enumerable if there is a Turing machine that
halts exactly on the elements of A (equivalently, outputs exactly the elements of A), and that A is
decidable if there exists a Turing machine that halts on all inputs and accepts on input n iff n ∈ A.
Definition 2.15. We assume a standard Gödel numbering of the Turing machines and denote
by Tm the mth Turing machine in this numbering, and by ϕm : N ⇀ N the partial function
computed by Tm . If n ∈ N, we write ϕm(n) ↓ if Tm halts on input n ∈ N. The jump is the set
∅′ = {n ∈ N : ϕn(n)↓}.
The jump ∅′ is known to be recursively enumerable and undecidable [22, §13.1]. We shall use
Smullyan’s notion of recursive inseparability [26]:
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Definition 2.16. Let Σ be a non-empty alphabet. Sets A,B ⊆ Σ∗ are said to be recursively insepa-
rable if A ∩ B = ∅ and there is no decidable set C ⊆ Σ∗ such that A ⊆ C and B ⊆ Σ∗ \C .
Observe that if A is not decidable then A and its complement are recursively inseparable. We
use two standard sets known to be recursively inseparable:
Definition 2.17. Define A = {n ∈ N : ϕn(n)↓ ∧ϕn(n) = 0}, and B = {n ∈ N : ϕn(n)↓ ∧Tn(n) ,
0}.
The following is well-known and provable by standard methods (see, e.g. [18]):
Proposition 2.18. SetsA, B andA∪B are (i) recursively enumerable, (ii) undecidable, and (iii)
recursively inseparable.
Definition 2.19. For n ∈ N, define:
An = {i ∈ N : (i ≤ n) ∧ (Ti halts in at most n − i steps on input i) ∧ (ϕi (i) = 0)}
Bn = {i ∈ N : (i ≤ n) ∧ (Ti halts in at most n − i steps on input i) ∧ (ϕi (i) , 0)} 
Remark 2.20. Observe that A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A3 ⊆ · · · ⊆ A and B1 ⊆ B2 ⊆ B3 ⊆ · · · ⊆ B. Clearly,
An and Bn are finite for all n ∈ N and hence decidable (even stronger: there exists a Turing machine
that on input n will output (the Gödel number of) a Turing machine decidingAn because a universal
Turing machine can simulate at most n steps of Ti on input i ; similarly for Bn). Observe also that for
n ∈ A, there is some k ∈ N such that Tn halts in k steps on input n, whence n ∈ An+k .
Definition 2.21. A pure strategy si : HG∞ → Ai for Pi is computable if there is a Turing machine
that, on input a finite history h ∈ HG∞ (represented by some element of {0, 1}∗) halts with output
si (h) (represented by some element of {0, 1}∗).
3 NON-TRIVIAL GAMES AND BEST RESPONSES
Consider a 2-player normal-form gameG and its infinite repetitionG∞ with limit-of-means payoff.
Definition 3.1. Let G be a 2-player normal-form game and a−i be an action available to Player
−i . We define Mi (a−i ) = maxai ∈Ai ui (ai ,a−i ), andMi = maxa∈A ui (a). 
Suppose that the payoff of the best response of P1 is independent of the action played by P2,
that is ∀a2 ∈ A2 : M1 = M1(a2). This is equivalent to saying that no action gives Player 1 higher
payoff than their minmax payoff, and we will call such games trivial for P1.
Definition 3.2. Let G be a 2-player normal-form game. Then, G is said to be trivial for Pi if
Mi = min
a−i ∈A−i
max
ai ∈Ai
ui (ai ,a−i ). G is said to be non-trivial for Pi if it is not trivial for Pi. 
For example, Prisoner’s Dilemma is non-trivial for any player; an example of a game that is
trivial for any player is Rock-Paper-Scissors (see Example 6.1).
If a game is trivial for a player, that player will always have a best response to any strategy;
moreover, the best response to a strategy requires no more computational resources than the orig-
inal strategy, as it needs only scan the correct row (or column) of the payoff matrix and play the
action maximising their profit in the current stage:
Lemma 3.3. Let G be trivial for P1. Then, under limit-of-means payoff:
(1) Every strategy of P2 has a best response.
(2) Every computable strategy of P2 has a computable best response.
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Proof. Let s2 be any strategy of P2. Define s1 to be the strategy of P1 that, given a finite history
hT ∈ HT
G∞ , in stage T + 1 computes a2 = s2(hT ) and plays a1 = argmax
a′
1
∈A1
u1(a′1,a2). Because G is
trivial for P1, u1(a1,a2) = M1. P1’s limit-of-means payoff when playing s1 is:
υ1 (s1, s2) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=1
u1(h∞1 [i],h∞2 [i]) = M1.
Because M1 is the maximum payoff P1 can obtain in G , it is also the maximum limit-of-means
payoff P1 can obtain inG∞, and hence s1 is a best response to s2. If s2 is computable, then s1 clearly
computable as the set of available actions A1 is finite. 
Hence, non-triviality is a necessary condition for the existence of strategies without a best re-
sponse, and of computable strategies without a computable best response. It turns out that it is
also a sufficient condition.
Definition 3.4. Let G be non-trivial for Player 1. Define C1,D1 ∈ A1 and C2,D2 ∈ A2 to be any
actions satisfying (1) u1(C1,C2) = M1, and (2) u1(D1,D2) = M1(D2) < M1. 
The action profile (C1,C2) gives P1 the maximum possible payoff inG . The existence of (D1,D2),
where D1 is a best response to D2, but P1 obtains a lower payoff than from (C1,C2), is guaranteed
by non-triviality ofG . We intentionally use the same notation as for Prisoner’s dilemma to differen-
tiate between the high-payoff and low-payoff action profiles, so that the strategies defined in this
section are reminiscent of the strategies from [15]. However, we do not–at the moment–require
(D1,D2) to be a Nash equilibrium ofG .
3.1 Every non-trivial game has a strategy having no best response
We now define a computable strategy that does not admit a best response (computable or other-
wise).
Definition 3.5. LetG be non-trivial for P1. Define σd2 to be P2’s strategy inG
∞ that, given a finite
history hT ∈ HTG∞ , plays the following action in stage T + 1 :
(1) Play D2 if Player 1 has never playedC1 in hT .
(2) If Player 1 has playedC1 in hT , let t be the first stage when Player 1 playsC1. If (t +1) divides
(T + 1), play D2, otherwise playC2.
Lemma 3.6. σd2 is a computable strategy. If G is non-trivial for P1, then σ
d
2 has no best response.
Proof. σd2 is clearly computable:A Turingmachine can scan the finite historyh
T to findwhether
P1 has playedC1 at any stage. If so, the first such stage t can be found in finite time, and it is clearly
decidable whether t + 1 divides T + 1.
Now, let s1 be any strategy for P1, and let h∞ be the path of play induced by the strategy profile
s = (s1,σd2 ), and let h∞i [T ] be the action played by Player i in stage T . Split on cases as follows:
• P1 plays C1 in at least one stage of G∞. Let t be the first stage where P1 does so. Then, P1’s
payoff is:
υ1
(
s1,σ
d
2
)
= lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=1
u1(h∞1 [i],h∞2 [i]) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=t+1
u1(h∞1 [i],h∞2 [i]) ≤
M1(D2) + tM1
t + 1
where the final inequality follows from the fact that P1’s maximumpayoff in any stagewhere
P2 playsD2 isM1(D2)which happens with frequency 1/(t+1) at each stage afterT ; similarly,
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P2 plays C1 with frequency t/(t + 1) after stage T (every stage where t + 1 does not divide
T + 1), and in each stage where P2 playsC1, P1’s payoff is at mostM1.
Let s ′1 be the strategy for P1 that playsC1 for the first time in stage t +1 (and plays any other
action in the first t stages); for T > t , in stage T + 1, P1 plays D1 if t + 2 divides T + 1, and
otherwise plays C1. Then, by the same reasoning as above:
υ1
(
s ′1,σ
d
2
)
=
M1(D2) + (t + 1)M1
t + 2
> υ1
(
s1,σ
d
2
)
Thus, the strategy s1 is not a best response to σd2 .
• P1 does not play C1 in any stage of G∞. Then, by the definition of σd2 , P1’s payoff is:
υ1
(
s1,σ
d
2
)
≤ M1(D2)
Consider the strategy s ′1 for P1 that playsC1 in odd-numbered stages andD1 in even-numbered
stages. The strategy profile (s ′1,σd2 ) has path of play
h∞ = ((C1,D2), (D1,D2), (C1,C2), (D1,D2), (C1,C2), . . . )
and P1’s payoff is thus:
υ1
(
s ′1,σ
d
2
)
= lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=1
u1(h∞1 [i],h∞2 [i]) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=2
u1(h∞1 [i],h∞2 [i])
=
1
2
(M1(D2) +M1) > M1(D2) ≥ υ1
(
s1,σ
d
2
)
and thus s1 is not a best response to σd2 .
Thus, for every choice of strategy for P1, there exists another strategy obtaining better payoff
against σd2 , and we conclude that no best response to σ
d
2 exists. 
3.2 Every non-trivial game has a strategy having a best response, but no computable
best response
We now present a computable strategy that has a best response, but no computable best response.
The game is split into periods consisting of one test stage and Kr reward stages for some large
enough integer Kr .
Definition 3.7. Let G be non-trivial for P1, and let Kr be the least integer satisfying
1
Kr + 1
(u1(D1,C2) + KrM1) > u1(D1,D2).
Define σ e2 to be the strategy for P2 that, given a finite history h
T ∈ HT
G∞ , plays the following action
in stage T + 1:
(i) If, for any t satisfying 0 < Kr t < T , either
hT1 [Kr t + 1] , C1 & (t ∈ AT ), (1)
or
hT1 [Kr t + 1] , D1 & (t ∈ BT ), (2)
play D2.
(ii) Otherwise, playC2. 
We first prove that the strategy σ e2 has a best response:
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Definition 3.8. Define σ e1 to be the strategy for P1 that, given a finite history h
T ∈ HTG∞ , plays
the following action in stageT + 1 : (i) If there exists some t ∈ B such that T = Kr t , then play D1;
(ii) otherwise, playC1.
Lemma 3.9. σ e2 is a computable strategy, and ifG is non-trivial for P1, then σ
e
2 has a best response,
but no best response to σ e2 is a computable strategy.
Proof. By Remark 2.20, there is a Turingmachine that, on inputT will output the Gödel number,
k , of a Turing machine deciding AT (and similarly for BT ); by using a universal Turing machine
to simulate Tk , it is clearly decidable whether, for any t such that 0 < Kr t < T , we have t ∈ AT ,
respectively t ∈ BT ; and clearly, it is directly checkable by a simple lookup in the history hT ,
whether hT1 [Kr t + 1] , C1, respectively hT1 [Kr t + 1] , D1. Hence, σ e2 is a computable strategy.
Leth∞ be the path of play induced by the strategy profile s = (σ e1 ,σ e2 ), and leth∞i [T ] be the action
played by Pi in stageT . P2 starts by playingC2, and playsD2 only if condition (1) or (2) in Definition
3.7 is satisfied for some t ,T ∈ N. Condition (1) implies t ∈ A, in which case hT1 [Kr t + 1] = C1 by
the definition of σ e1 . Thus,h
T
1 [Kr t +1] , C1 is not satisfied, and the symmetric argument applies to
(2), so P1 always plays D2. P1’s payoff in every test stage is at least u1(D1,C2), and in every reward
stage equals u1(C1,C2), so the limit-of-means payoff of P1 is:
υ1
(
σ e1 ,σ
e
2
)
= lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=1
u1(h∞1 [i],h∞2 [i]) ≥
1
Kr + 1
(u1(D1,C2) + KrM1) > u1(D1,D2).
Let s¯1 be any strategy for P1, define s¯ = (s¯1,σ e2 ), and let h¯∞ be the path of play induced by the
strategy profile s¯. By definition of σ e2 , in each stage, P2 either plays C2 or D2. There are thus two
possibilities:
• P2 always plays C2, that is, for all T ∈ N, h¯∞2 [T ] = C2. Assume, for contradiction, that s¯1
is a strictly better response to σ e2 than σ
e
1 , that is, that υ1
(
s¯1,σ
e
2
)
> υ1
(
σ e1 ,σ
e
2
)
. Then, for
some stage T ∈ N, u1(h¯∞1 [T ],C2) > u1(h∞1 [T ],C2), and because u1(C1,C2) = M1, we have
h∞1 [T ] = D1 and h¯∞1 [T ] , D1. But if h∞1 [T ] = D1, then T = Kr t + 1 for some t ∈ B and by
Remark 2.20 there is then some m ∈ N such that t ∈ Bm . Because h¯∞1 [Kr t + 1] , D1 and
t ∈ Bm , the definition of σ e2 yields that h¯∞2 [m + 1] = D2, contradicting that P2 always plays
C2. Hence, υ1
(
s¯1,σ
e
2
) ≤ υ1 (σ e1 ,σ e2 ) .
• P2 plays D2 in some stage T + 1, that is, h¯∞2 [T + 1] = D2. By definition of σ e2 , there is some
t ∈ N such that Kr t < T , and either condition (1), or condition (2), in Definition 3.7 is
satisfied. Therefore, P2 continues playing D2 forever, and hence:
υ1
(
s¯1,σ
e
2
)
= lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=1
u1(h¯∞1 [i], h¯∞2 [i]) ≤ u1(D1,D2) < υ1
(
σ e1 ,σ
e
2
)
By the above, σ e1 is a best response to σ
e
2 . To prove that no computable best response exists,
assume, for contradiction, that there is a computable best response s¯1 to σ e2 . By the above analysis,
we know that if P2 ever playsD2, thenυ1
(
σ e1 ,σ
e
2
)
> υ1
(
s¯1,σ
e
2
)
. As s¯1 is a best response, s¯1 must thus
ensure that P2 playsC2 at every stage in the game. Hence, if t ∈ A, we must have h¯∞1 [Kr t+1] = C1,
and if t ∈ B, we must have h¯∞1 [Kr t + 1] = D1 (as otherwise, σ e2 will play C2). As s¯1 was assumed
to be computable, there is a Turing machine TMs¯1 computing s¯1. But then we can construct a
Turing machine Tk that uses TMs¯1 as a subroutine and accepts if h¯
∞
1 [Kr t + 1] = C1, rejects if
h¯∞1 [Kr t + 1] = D1, and rejects if h¯∞1 [Kr t + 1] < {C1,D1}. But thenTk halts on all inputs and decides
the language C = {n ∈ N : Tk accepts n}; but A ⊆ C and B ∩C = ∅, whence C is a decidable set
separating A and B, contradicting Proposition 2.18. Hence, there is no computable best response
to σ e2 , as desired. 
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3.3 A complete characterization
We now have our first main result:
Theorem 3.10. Let G be a 2-player normal-form game. The following are equivalent under limit-
of-means payoff inG∞:
(a) G is non-trivial for P1.
(b) There is a strategy for P2 in G∞ that has no best response.
(c) There is a computable strategy for P2 in G∞ that has no best response.
(d) There is a strategy profile s = (s1, s2) in G∞ satisfying
(1) s1 is a best response to s2,
(2) s2 is computable,
(3) s2 does not have a computable best response.
Proof. We prove that (a) is equivalent to (b), (c), and (d). If (a) holds, then Lemma 3.6 yields
existence of a computable strategy in G∞ that has no best response, whence (c) and, a fortiori, (b)
hold. Similarly, if (a) holds, Lemma 3.9 yields that (d) holds. If either of (b) or (c) hold, it follows
from Lemma 3.3 thatG is non-trivial for P1, hence that (a) holds. Similarly, if (a) holds, the strategy
s2 is computable, but has no computable best response, whence Lemma 3.3 yields that G is non-
trivial for P1, and thus that (a) holds. 
Remark 3.11. Theorem 3.10 yields a simple criterion for checking whether G∞ has a computable
strategy without a best response: simply check whether the stage game G is non-trivial. The payoff
matrix of G is a |A1 | × |A2 | matrix, and verifying whether G is trivial for P1 amounts to checking
the condition M1 = min
a2∈A2
max
a1 ∈A1
u1(a1,a2). For any a2 ∈ A2, a single scan over A1 gives the value
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1,a2). Iterating over all a2 ∈ A2 gives min
a2∈A2
max
a1 ∈A1
u1(a1,a2), hence triviality (and thus, non-
triviality) can be decided in time O(|A1 | · |A2 |).
4 INTERMEZZO: FOLK THEOREMS
Folk theorems characterize the payoff profiles that are achievable under equilibria in different
settings, depending on how the payoff is computed or which kind of equilibria we are interested
in. The conclusion of all folk theorems is approximately the same – every payoff profile satisfying
two minimal requirements is achievable under a Nash equilibrium. First, individual rationality,
demands at least the obvious minimal payoff (the minmax payoff) for every player and second,
feasibility, ensures that the payoffs in the repeated game can be combined from the stage game
payoffs. The proofs of folk theorems are usually constructive and provide us with actual strategy
profiles that lead to given payoff profiles–we restate well-known folk theorems belowwith explicit
assertions of the existence of computable equilibria (we stress that the proofs and proof ideas are
not ours, but are already well-known). We shall use the folk theorems in Section 5.
Definition 4.1. Let G = (N ,A,u) be a normal-form game and let υ = (υ1, . . . ,υn) ∈ Qn be a
payoff profile.
(1) υ is said to be individually rational for Pi ifυi ≥ min
a−i ∈A−i
max
ai ∈Ai
ui (ai ,a−i ). Furthermore,υ is said
to be strictly individually rational for Pi if the inequality is strict. υ is said to be individually
rational if it is individually rational for all players.
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(2) υ is said to be (rationally) feasible if there exists a non-negative vector α ∈ Q |A | satisfying∑
a∈A αa = 1 and ∀i ∈ N : υi =
∑
a∈A αaui (a)1.
Remark 4.2. υ ∈ Q |A | is feasible iff it is in the convex hull of the payoff profiles ofG : If υ ∈ Q |A | is
in the convex hull of the payoff profiles ofG , there is a vector β ∈ R |A | with non-negative components
such that
∑
a∈A βa = 1 and ∀i ∈ N : υi =
∑
a∈A βaui (a), and as the components of β are non-negative
and υi and allui (a) are rational, then the components of β must be rational. Conversely, if υ is feasible,
then υ is obviously in the convex hull of the point set ∪a∈A{u(a)}.
Observe that any payoff of a strategy profile of G∞ is in the convex hull of the payoff profiles of G
(this follows from direct inspection of the definition of limit-of-means payoff)—essentially the weights
of the payoff profiles correspond to the frequency with which the payoff profiles occur.
The following theorem is adapted from Aumann [2]:
Theorem 4.3 (Folk Theorem–Nash Eqilibria). LetG = (N ,A,u) be a normal-form game.
(1) If υ ∈ RN is a payoff profile under a Nash equilibrium in G∞ then υ is individually rational.
(2) If υ ∈ QN is feasible and individually rational then there is a Nash equilibrium s inG∞ leading
to the payoff profile υ such that every strategy in s is computable.
Theorem 4.3 describes a set of payoff profiles that are achievable under a Nash equilibrium.
Aumann and Shapley [3] (see also [20, Prop. 146.2]) prove a similar result for subgame-perfect
equilibria. As every subgame-perfect equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium, Theorem 4.3 implies
that every payoff profile under a subgame-perfect equilibrium is individually rational. Surprisingly,
the sufficient condition for the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria with a given payoff profile
is not stricter than for Nash equilibria:
Theorem 4.4 (Folk Theorem–subgame-perfect eqilibria). Let G = (N ,A,u) be a normal-
form game, and let υ ∈ QN be a feasible and individually rational payoff profile. There is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium s inG∞ leading to the payoff profile υ in every subgame such that every strategy
in s is computable.
5 COMPUTABILITY UNDER NASH AND SUBGAME-PERFECT EQUILIBRIA
Theorem 3.10 shows that any game satisfying some simple conditions has a computable strategy
without a computable best response. However, strategy profiles are generally not of much interest
unless they are Nash equilibria, or subgame-perfect equilibria. We treat these cases in the present
section. We first prove two auxiliary lemmas before obtaining a complete characterization at the
end of the section.
5.1 Nash equilibria
We first treat Nash equilibria. Observe that if s = (s1, s2) is a Nash equilibrium of G∞, then s1 is a
best response to s2.
Lemma 5.1. Let G = (N ,A,u) be a 2-player normal-form game. The following are equivalent:
(a) There is a strategy profile s = (s1, s2) in G∞ satisfying
(1) s is a Nash equilibrium of G∞,
(2) s2 is computable,
(3) s2 does not have a computable best response.
1In some places in the literature, υ is called feasible if the vector α is merely required to be an element of R|A | instead of
Q|A |–in which case the set of feasible payoff profiles υ is exactly the elements in the convex hull of the set of payoff profiles
of the stage game. We prefer to keep α ∈ Q|A | as it yields a cleaner statement of the constructive parts of folk theorems.
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(b) |A1 | ≥ 2, and there is a Nash equilibrium s ′ of G∞ that is strictly individually rational for P1,
that is, s ′ satisfies:
υ1(s ′) > min
a2 ∈A2
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1,a2).
Proof. IfG∞ does not have a Nash equilibrium then the equivalence is obvious. IfG∞ does have
a strategy profile s ′ that is a Nash equilibrium, Theorem 4.3 yields that s ′ leads to an individually
rational payoff profile, and thus in particular υ1(s ′) ≥ mina2∈A2 maxa1 ∈A1u1(a1,a2).
We first prove that ¬(b) ⇒ ¬(a). Assume that (b) does not hold; if |A1 | = 1, then there is
exactly one strategy for P1, namely the one always playing the single action available to P1, and is
obviously both computable and a best response to any strategy of P2, and hence (a) does not hold.
If |A1 | ≥ 2 and (b) does not hold, then every Nash equilibrium s ′ of G∞ leads to a payoff profile
υ (s ′) satisfying υ1(s ′) = mina2∈A2 maxa1 ∈A1u1(a1,a2). If there is no Nash equilibrium s = (s1, s2) such that s2
is computable, it follows immediately that (a) does not hold. So, assume that s = (s1, s2) is a Nash
equilibrium such that s2 is computable. Define s¯1 to be the strategy of Player 1 that in stageT + 1,
given a finite history hT ∈ HTG∞ , first simulates s2 to obtain a¯2 = s2(hT ), and then plays any action
a¯1 satisfying u1(a¯1, a¯2) = M1(a¯2) ≥ min
a2∈A2
max
a1 ∈A1
u1(a1,a2). As υ1 (s¯1, s2) ≥ mina2∈A2 maxa1 ∈A1u1(a1,a2) =
υ1 (s1, s2) and s1 is a best response to s2, s¯1 is also a best response to s2. Moreover, s¯1 is clearly a
computable strategy because s2 is. Thus, (3) does not hold, and ¬(b) ⇒ ¬(a) follows.
We now prove (b) ⇒ (a). Assume that (b) holds; by Theorem 4.3, there is a payoff profile
that is feasible and strictly individually rational for P1 leading to a Nash equilibrium s = (s1, s2)
where s1 and s2 are computable, and υ (s) = υ (s ′). We will modify s so that no best response to
P2’s strategy is computable. The modification adds a test procedure to the stages of s2 that are a
power of 2. P2 will verify if P1 played the correct action in all previous test stages, and if this test
is passed, both players will pretend that they played according to s in test stages when deciding
to play the next action. Formally, fix any C1,D1 ∈ A1 such that C1 , D1 and define D2 ∈ A2 as
D2 = argmin
a2∈A2
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1,a2), henceM1(D2) < υ1(s). Leth(s) be the path of play obtained by playing
s . For a finite history hT ∈ HTG∞ , define fix(hT ) ∈ HTG∞ by fix(hT )[t] = h(s)[t] if t = 2i for some
i ∈ N, and fix(hT )[t] = hT [t] otherwise. Now, define s¯2 to be the strategy for P2 that, given a finite
history hT ∈ HTG∞ , plays the following action in stage T + 1:
(1) If for any t satisfying 0 < 2t ≤ T , either
hT1 [2t ] , C1 & (t ∈ AT ),
or
hT1 [2t ] , D1 & (t ∈ BT ),
play D2.
(2) Otherwise, play s2(fix(hT )).
Now, define s¯1 to be the strategy for P1 that, given a finite history hT ∈ HTG∞ , plays the following
in stage T + 1:
(1) IfT + 1 = 2t for some t ∈ B, play D1.
(2) IfT + 1 = 2t for some t ∈ A, playC1.
(3) Otherwise, play s1(fix(hT )).
We claim that s¯ = (s¯1, s¯2) is a Nash equilibrium of G∞, that s¯2 is a computable strategy, and that
s¯2 does not have a computable best response, that is, all three conditions of (a) are satisfied. First
observe that s¯2 is a computable strategy: As s2 is computable, a Turing machine that computes it
Jakub Dargaj and Jakob Grue Simonsen 13
can be used as a subroutine by a Turing machine TM that, by Remark 2.20, on inputT can generate
the Gödel numbers of Turing machines decidingAT and BT , and subsequently simulate these on
input t using a universal Turing machine as a subroutine.
Next, we prove that s¯ is a Nash equilibrium. Observe that the payoffs in test stages T satisfy:
1
T
⌊log2 T ⌋∑
i=1
u1(h∞s¯ [2i ]) =
1
T
⌊log2 T ⌋∑
i=1
u1(h∞s [2i ]) =
O(log2T )
T
and the paths of play h∞s and h
∞
s¯ are identical at non-test-stages, whence at any test stage T :
T∑
i=1
u1(h∞s¯ [i]) −
⌊log2 T ⌋∑
i=1
u1(h∞s¯ [2i ]) =
T∑
i=1
u1(h∞s [i]) −
⌊log2 T ⌋∑
i=1
u1(h∞s [2i ])
Hence, P1’s payoff is:
υ1(s¯) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=1
u1(h∞s¯ [i])
= lim inf
T→∞
1
T
©­«
⌊log2 T ⌋∑
i=1
u1(h∞s¯ [2i ]) +
T∑
i=1
u1(h∞s¯ [i]) −
⌊log2 T ⌋∑
i=1
u1(h∞s¯ [2i ])ª®¬
≥ lim inf
T→∞
1
T
⌊log2 T ⌋∑
i=1
u1(h∞s¯ [2i ]) + lim inf
T→∞
1
T
©­«
T∑
i=1
u1(h∞s [i]) −
⌊log2 T ⌋∑
i=1
u1(h∞s [2i ])ª®¬
= lim inf
T→∞
O(log2T )
T
+ lim inf
T→∞
1
T
(
T∑
i=1
u1(h∞s [i]) −O(log2T )
)
= lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=1
u1(h∞s [i]) = υ1(s) > M1(D2)
By definition of s¯2, if P1 ever deviates from the strategy s¯1 in a test stage (T = 2t ), P1 will obtain
the limit-of-means payoff M1(D2) < υ1(s¯), making the deviation unprofitable. If P1 deviates from
s¯1 (and hence also s1) at a non-test-stage, P1 cannot obtain strictly greater payoff than υ1(s¯) = υ1(s)
because s is a Nash equilibrium. The paths of play obtained by playing s and s¯ are identical outside
of test stages, so by a symmetric argument, P2’s payoffυ2(s¯) = υ2(s). If P2 ever deviates, P1 punishes
them by switching to the minmax against P2 forever. Because υ (s) is individually rational, this
deviation also cannot yield strictly greater payoff, and hence s¯ is a Nash equilibrium.
It remains to prove that s¯2 has no computable best response. Observe that any best response
s¯ ′1 to s¯2 cannot deviate from s¯1 in any test stage, because otherwise P2 would play D2 forever,
resulting in P1 obtaining payoff at most M1(D2) < υ1(s¯). Assume, for contradiction, that s¯ ′1 were
computable; then, there is a Turing machine TM′1 computing s¯
′
1. As s¯2 is computable, let TM2 be
a Turing machine computing s¯2, and let TMд be a Turing machine that, on input t ∈ N, first
simulates both TM′1 and TM2 2
t times to obtain the action profile h2
t [2t ] induced by (s¯ ′1, s¯2). Then,
TMд accepts if h2
t
1 [2t ] = C1, and rejects otherwise. Observe that TMд then decides a language C
such that A ⊆ C and B ∩C = ∅, contradicting the fact that A and B are recursively inseparable
by Proposition 2.18. 
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5.2 Subgame-perfect equilibria
As Theorem 4.4 states that focusing on subgame-perfect equilibria does not narrow the set of
payoff profiles compared to Nash equilibria, it should be no surprise that the below lemma for
subgame-perfect equilibria requires the same conditions as Lemma 5.1
Lemma 5.2. Let G be a 2-player normal-form game. The following are equivalent:
(a) There is a strategy profile s = (s1, s2) in G∞ satisfying
(1) s is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of G∞,
(2) s2 is computable,
(3) s2 does not have a computable best response.
(b) |A1 | ≥ 2, and there is a Nash equilibrium s ′ of G∞ that is strictly individually rational for P1,
that is, s ′ satisfies:
υ1(s ′) > min
a2 ∈A2
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1,a2). (3)
Proof. We first prove (a)⇒ (b). Assume that (a) holds. If |A1 | = 1, then there is a single strategy
for P1, namely the one always playing the single action in A1; clearly, this strategy is computable,
whence (a) could not hold, contradicting the assumption, and we thus conclude that |A| ≥ 2;
furthermore, a strategy profile that is a subgame-perfect equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium,
and by Lemma 5.1 we thus conclude that (b) holds.
The proof of (b) ⇒ (a) proceeds in the same fashion as the proof of Lemma 5.1, with some
modifications to accomodate subgame-perfect equilibria. Assume that (b) holds, and let s ′ be a
Nash equilibrium ofG∞ such thatυ1(s ′) > mina2 ∈A2 maxa1∈A1u1(a1,a2). By Theorem4.4, there is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium s = (s1, s2)where both s1 and s2 are computable andυ (s) = υ (s ′).Wewill modify
s as in the proof of Lemma 5.1, except that we allow only finite punishments (to ensure a subgame-
perfect equilibrium). If a deviation in a test stage is detected in stageTD , then P2 plays the minmax
against P1 for the next T 2D − TD stages (we will colloquially call this a punishment phase of the
game).
Fix any C1,D1 ∈ A1 such that C1 , D1, and let D2 ∈ A2 be a minmax action against P1, that
is, M1(D2) = u1(D2) = min
a2∈A2
max
a1 ∈A1
u1(a1,a2); observe that M1(D2) < υ1(s). For n ∈ A ∪ B, define
detect(n) to be the least m ∈ N such that n ∈ Am ∪ Bm . For a finite history hT ∈ HTG∞ , define
fix(hT ) ∈ HTG∞ by fix(hT )[t] = h(s)[t] if t = 2i for some i ∈ N, and fix(hT )[t] = hT [t] otherwise.
Define s¯2 to be the strategy for P2 that, given a finite history hT ∈ HTG∞ , plays the following action
in stage T + 1:
(1) If for any t satisfying 0 < 2t ≤ T and detect(t) > √T , either
hT1 [2t ] , C1 & (t ∈ AT ),
or
hT1 [2t ] , D1 & (t ∈ BT ),
play D2.
(2) Otherwise, play s2(fix(hT )).
Define s¯1 to be Player 1’s strategy that, given a finite history hT ∈ HTG∞ , plays the following action
in stage T + 1:
(1) IfT + 1 = 2t for some t ∈ B, play D1.
(2) if T + 1 = 2t for some t ∈ A, play C1.
(3) Otherwise, play s1(fix(hT )).
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We claim that s¯ = (s¯1, s¯2) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, that s¯2 is computable, and that no
best response to s¯2 is a computable strategy.
We first prove that s¯2 is a computable strategy: As s2 is computable, a Turing machine that com-
putes it can be used as a subroutine by a Turing machine TM that, by Remark 2.20, on inputT can
generate the Gödel numbers of Turing machines decidingAT and BT , and subsequently simulate
these on inputs on the form 2t using a universal Turing machine as a subroutine. Furthermore,
even though the function detect is not directly computable, it is decidable whether detect(t) > √T
as it suffices to generate all elements of the sets Ai and Bi with i ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊
√
T ⌋}, which can be
done by Remark 2.20.
We proceed to prove that s¯ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Observe that, by the definition of
s¯ , υ1(s¯) = υ1(s) > M1(D2) and υ2(s¯) = υ2(s). Consider a finite history hT ∈ HTG∞ and a subgame
(G∞,hT ). If both players play s¯ in (G∞,hT ), they obtain the payoff profile υ (s¯), as any punishment
phase of a deviation in hT lasts at most until stage
(max{detect(1), detect(2), . . . , detect(⌊log2T ⌋)})2
Because s is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, any unilateral deviation by P2 cannot result in strictly
greater payoff for P2. If P1 deviates for only a finite number of stages, let TX be the stage of the
last such a deviation. Starting from stage
1 + (max{detect(1), detect(2), . . . , detect(⌊log2(TX )⌋)})2
the path of play returns to the path of play determined by s¯1 and s¯2, leading to the limit-of-means
payoff υ (s¯) again. Now, if P1 deviates in infinitely many stages, letT0,T1,T2, . . . be the sequence of
stages when P1’s deviation is first detected by P2 (i.e., when case (1) in the definition of s¯2 applies
after a period of playing s1(fix(hT ))). The payoff at the end of the nth punishment phase (that is,
in stage Tn + (T 2n −Tn) = T 2n ) is at most
1
T 2n
(
Tn max
a∈A
{u1(a)} + (T 2n −Tn)M1(D1)
)
≤ M1(D1) +O(1/n)
As the payoff of the infinitely repeated game is the limit inferior of the payoffs after finitely many
stages, P1’s payoff when performing infinitely many deviations is thus in particular at most
lim inf
n→∞
(
min
a2 ∈A2
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1,a2) +O(1/n)
)
≤ M1(D1) ≤ υ1(s¯)
whence no deviation of P1 can result in strictly greater payoff thanυ1(s¯). Moreover, sinceM1(D1) <
υ1(s¯), any best response of P1 can deviate only finitely many times. As no deviation of any player
following any finite history would strictly increase their payoff, s¯ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
We now prove that any best response to s¯2 is not computable. Assume, for contradiction, that s¯2
has a computable best response s¯ ′1. By the previous argument, s¯
′
1 deviates from the prescribed path
only finitely many times, and thus a fortiori it deviates in test stages only finitely many times. Let
TX = 2
tx be the last test stage where s¯ ′1 deviates. As s¯2 is computable, let TM2 be a Turing machine
computing s¯2, and let TM′1 be a Turing machine computing s¯
′
1. Let TMд be a Turing machine that,
on input t ∈ N does the following:
• if t ≤ tX , TMд looks up in an array of length tX whether t ∈ A, and accepts if it is, and
rejects otherwise.
• If t > tX , TMд first simulates both TM′1 and TM2 2t times to obtain the action profile h2
t [2t ]
induced by (s¯ ′1, s¯2). Then, TMд accepts if h2
t
1 [2t ] = C1, and rejects otherwise.
Now, by construction, TMд halts on all inputs and decides a language C such that A ⊆ C and
C ∩ B = ∅, contradicting the fact that A and B are recursively inseparable by Proposition 2.18.
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Thus, s¯ satisfies all conditions (1) - (3), and thus (b) holds, as desired. 
5.3 A complete characterization of Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria
We can now finally give a complete characterization of games where a strategy for P2–required to
be part of a strategy profile that is either a Nash equilibrium or subgame-perfect equilibrium–has
no computable best response:
Theorem 5.3. Let G be a 2-player normal-form game. The following are equivalent:
(a) There is a strategy profile s = (s1, s2) in G∞ satisfying
(1) s is a Nash equilibrium of G∞,
(2) s2 is computable,
(3) s2 does not have a computable best response.
(b) There is a strategy profile s = (s1, s2) in G∞ satisfying
(1) s is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of G∞,
(2) s2 is computable,
(3) s2 does not have a computable best response.
(c) |A1 | ≥ 2, and there is a Nash equilibrium s ′ of G∞ that is strictly individually rational for P1,
that is, s ′ satisfies:
υ1(s ′) > min
a2 ∈A2
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1,a2). (4)
Proof. The result follows directly from Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2. 
Condition (c) of Theorem 5.3 might at the first glance seem difficult to check, but the Folk
theorem provides us with an efficient algorithm for deciding whether there is a Nash equilibrium
of G∞ that is strictly individually rational for P1. By Remark 4.2, every payoff profile of G∞ is in
the convex hull C of the payoff profiles of G , and by Theorem 4.3, every Nash equilibrium of G∞
is individually rational, whence the set of Nash equilibria of G∞ is a subset of the intersection of
the convex hull C and the set
Q = {(x ,y) ∈ R2 : x ≥ min
a2 ∈A2
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1,a2),y ≥ min
a1∈A1
max
a2 ∈A2
u2(a1,a2)}
But also by Theorem 4.3, for every feasible and individually rational payoff profile υ, there is a
Nash equilibrium s of G∞ with payoff profile υ. Hence, every payoff profile υ ∈ Q2 in C ∩ Q is a
Nash equilibrium.
To verify condition (c), it thus suffices to consider the various cases of C∩Q. If C∩Q = {(p,q)},
it is one of the corner points of C or Q, hence either the minmax profile or one of the payoff
profiles of G , and hence has rational components; thus, (p,q) is a Nash equilibrium, and we can
check directly if p > min
a2 ∈A2
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1,a2). If C ∩ Q is a line segment L, the fact that Q is an upper-
right quarter-plane (hence have edges parallel to the x- and y-axes) entail that L is either a subset
of Z1 = {(x ,y) : x ≥ min
a2∈A2
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1,a2)}, or of Z2 = {(x ,y) : y ≥ min
a1 ∈A1
max
a2∈A2
u2(a1,a2)}; if L
is a subset of Z1 (clearly checkable by testing a single point), there are no Nash equilibria s with
υ1(s) > mina2 ∈A2 maxa1∈A1u1(a1,a2), and if L is a subset of Z2, density of Q
2 in R2, entails that L contains
a point with rational components, which then by Theorem 4.3 corresponds to a Nash equilibrium
s with υ1(s) > mina2∈A2 maxa1 ∈A1u1(a1,a2), whence (c) holds. Finally, if C ∩ Q is neither a singleton, nor a
line segment, it is itself a convex polygon, and by density ofQ2 in R2 is contains a point (p,q) ∈ Q2
with p > min
a2 ∈A2
max
a1∈A1
u1(a1,a2) that is a Nash equilibrium by Theorem 4.3.
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Computing C ∩ Q can be performed by first restricting Q to a sufficiently large rectangle, for
example the rectangle with lower-left corner(
min
a2∈A2
max
a1 ∈A1
u1(a1,a2), min
a1∈A1
max
a2 ∈A2
u2(a1,a2)
)
and upper-right corner (
max
a∈A
u1(a),max
a∈A
u2(a)
)
and subsequently using a standard algorithm for computing the intersection of convex polygons.
Using, e.g., Chan’s algorithm [7] for finding a convex hull of a set of n points runs in O(n logh)
time, whereh ≤ n denotes the number of points in the convex hull, and by any number of classical
algorithms, e.g. [24], the intersection of two convex polygons of size at most n can be computed
in O(n) time.
Hence, for a payoff matrix of dimension n×m, deciding whether condition (c) holds can be done
in O(nm lognm) time using the method described above.
6 SOME EXAMPLES OF APPLYING THE RESULTS
To illustrate our results, we give examples of well-known games that satisfy different criteria in
Theorems 3.10 and 5.3.
Example 6.1 (Rock-paper-scissors). Rock-paper-scissors is a two-player game with A1 = A2 =
{Rock, Paper, Scissors} and payoff matrix as follows:
Rock Paper Scissors
Rock 0, 0 -1, 1 1, -1
Paper 1, -1 0, 0 -1, 1
Scissors -1, 1 1, -1 0, 0
The minmax payoff profile of Rock-paper-scissors is (1, 1), while 1 is also the maximum pay-
off that P1 can obtain. Hence, Rock-paper-scissors is trivial for P1 and by Theorem 3.10, every
computable strategy of P2 has a computable best response.
Example 6.2 (Deadlock). Deadlock is a two-player game G with A1 = A2 = {C,D} and payoff
matrix as follows:
C D
C 1, 1 0, 3
D 3, 0 2, 2
The minmax payoff profile of Deadlock is (2, 2) but P1 cannot obtain higher payoff than 2 under
a Nash equilibrium. By Theorem 3.10, there is a computable strategy of P2 without a computable
best response, but by Theorem 5.3, no such strategy is part of any strategy profile that is a Nash
equilibrium.
Example 6.3 (Stag hunt). Stag hunt is a two-player game G with A1 = A2 = {Stag, Hare} and
the following payoff matrix:
Stag Hare
Stag 3, 3 0, 2
Hare 2, 0 1, 1
The minmax payoff profile of Stag hunt is (1, 1), and the repeated play of (Stag, Stag) is a Nash
equilibrium ofG∞with P1’s payoff being 3. ByTheorem5.3, there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium
s = (s1, s2) (hence also a Nash equilibrium) of G∞ such that s2 is a computable strategy that does
not have computable best response.
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7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
While we have provided a complete characterization of two-player games with computable strate-
gies without computable best responses in the case of limit-of-means payoff, there are other stan-
dard ways of defining the payoff–notably the discounted payoff where sufficient conditions (not
known to be necessary) exist [18]–and complete characterizations must be established for these
as well. For the case of subrecursive computation where strategies are computed by machines with
strictly less extensional power than Turing machines, some results are known, notably for time
and space complexity classes (see, e.g. [9, 10]), but it would be interesting to have a general result
holding for all suitably well-behaved classes of (subrecursive) functions (e.g., classes axiomatizable
as in [16]). In addition, repeated games are just a special case of sequential games that are usually
represented in extensive form. Is it possible to apply the techniques used for infinitely repeated
games to infinite extensive-form games?
As similar computability problems can be investigated for games with imperfect information,
or cooperative games, it would be interesting to derive complete characterizations of games with
computable strategies without best responses in those settings; likewise, it would be interesting
to investigate whether our results carry over to a setting where mixed strategies–as opposed to
the pure strategies studied in this paper–are allowed. Finally, all of the above can be investigated
for games with more than two players, but this is likely to produce characterizations that are
substantially harder to check than those in the present paper; for example, Nash and subgame-
perfect equilibria are significantly harder to compute for repeated games with more than two
players under discounted payoff [6, 13]
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A MATERIAL OMITTED FROM THE MAIN TEXT
A full proof of Proposition 2.18 can be found in several publications (e.g., [18]). For completeness,
we also give a full proof below using the notation of the present paper.
Proof of Proposition 2.18. BothA and B are clearly recursively enumerable, and hence so is
A ∪ B.
To prove that A and B are recursively inseparable, define д : N → {0, 1} to be any (possibly
partial) function satisfying:
(1) д(n) = 1 if n ∈ A,
(2) д(n) = 0 if n ∈ B.
We claim that д is not computable. Suppose, for contradiction, that д were computable; then, let
k be the Gödel number of a Turing machine such that ϕk = д. Because ϕk (n)↓ for all n ∈ N, we
have ϕk (k)↓, and hence either k ∈ A or k ∈ B. If k ∈ A, we have ϕk (k) = 0, but by definition we
have д(k) = 1, a contradiction. Otherwise, we have k ∈ B, and thus ϕk (k) , 0; but д(k) = 0, and
we once again obtain a contradiction. Hence, д is not computable. But if there were a decidable set
C such that A ⊆ C and B ∩ C = ∅, we can construct a Turing machine with some Gödel number
l such that ϕl (n) = 1 iff n ∈ C and ϕl (n) = 0 otherwise. But as A ∩ B = ∅, ϕl then satisfies that
ϕl (n) = 1 of n ∈ A and ϕl (n) = 0 if n ∈ B which contradicts the above observation that no such
function is computable. Consequently,A and B are recursively inseparable.
Observe that if A were decidable, then the fact that A ∩ B = ∅ implies that A is a decidable
set separating A and B, contradicting recursive inseparability of the two sets. The proof of unde-
cidability of B is symmetric. Finally, note that A ∪ B = {n ∈ N : ϕn(n)↓} = ∅′, and henceA ∪ B
is undecidable. 
Below is a full proof–adapted from a proof by Aumann [2] but using the notation from the
present paper–of Theorem 4.3:
Proof of Theorem 4.3. (1) Assume, for contradiction, that there exists a Nash equilibrium s =
(s1, . . . , sn) ofG∞ with such that υi (s) = υi for all i ∈ N , but that there is some i ∈ N
υi < min
a−i ∈A−i
max
ai ∈Ai
ui (ai ,a−i ).
Consider a strategy s ′i for Pi that in stage t ∈ N plays a best response to the action profile a′−i
played by the other players. Pi’s payoff in every stage equals max
ai ∈Ai
ui (ai ,a′−i ), and hence this is
also the limit-of-means payoff of Pi inG∞. Because max
ai ∈Ai
ui (ai ,a′−i ) ≥ mina−i ∈A−i maxai ∈Ai ui (ai ,a−i ) > υi ,
si is not a best response to s−i . This contradicts s being a Nash equilibrium.
(2) We will construct a Nash equilibrium s so that, for all i ∈ N , υ (s) = υi . Because υ is feasible,
by definition we have, for all i ∈ N , that υi =
∑
a∈A αaui (a) for some α ∈ Q |A | with all components
non-negative. Each αa is rational, so we can rewrite it as αa =
βa
γ
for non-negative integers βa ,γ
satisfying
∑
a∈A βa = γ .
The payoff vectorυ is achieved by splittingG∞ into periods ofγ stages. Let s be a strategy profile
consisting of strategies that, in each period of length γ , play the action profile a for βa stages for
each a ∈ A in some fixed ordering of A, in case no player has deviated. If Pj unilaterally deviates
from the prescribed path of play, all other players play a′−j forever, where a
′
−j is a minmax action
against Pj, that is, an action profile satisfying max
aj ∈Aj
uj (aj ,a′−j ) = mina−j ∈A−j maxaj ∈Aj uj (aj ,a−j ). From the
assumption that υ is individually rational we have υj ≥ max
aj ∈Aj
uj (aj ,a′−j ). But max
aj ∈Aj
uj (aj ,a′−j ) is
an upper bound on the limit-of-means payoff that Pj can obtain if they deviate, and hence any
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deviation, by any player, from s cannot yield strictly greater payoff for that player, whence s is a
Nash equilibrium. By construction, the limit-of-means payoff of any player Pi on the prescribed
path of play is exactly υi , and hence s leads to the payoff profile υ.Moreover, every strategy in s is
computable, as it suffices to iterate over a table of length γ to play the next action and compare to
the finite history of previous actions played by the other players. 
Theorem4.4 was originally proved by Aumann and Shapley [3], but without making computabil-
ity of the subgame-perfect equilibria explicit in the statement of the result. Below is a proof, using
an adaptation of their methods, using the notation and general approach of the present paper:
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We modify the proof of Theorem 4.3 such that the strategy profile s is
a Nash equilibrium following any finite history. As in that proof, write υi =
∑
a∈A
βa
γ ui (a) for each
i ∈ N , and define each strategy in s to play the action profilea for βa stages for eacha ∈ A in periods
of length γ if no player has deviated from s . Define, for each j ∈ N , µ j = min
a−j ∈A−j
max
aj ∈Aj
uj (aj ,a−j ).
Observe that µ j ≤ υj ≤ maxa∈A uj (a). If any player Pj deviates at some stage T , the other players
play a minmax action profile against Pj (that is, a profile with payoff µ j for Pj) for T 2 − T stages
(we call this a punishment phase), and then revert to the strategy s .
Consider a finite history hT ∈ HT
G∞ and a subgame (G∞,hT ). If all players play s in (G∞,hT ),
they obtain the payoff profile υ because any deviation in hT is punished in at most T 2 −T stages
following hT . Consider any path of play; if Pj deviates from the prescribed path a finite number
of times, let TX be the stage of their last deviation. After the following T 2X − TX stages, the last
punishment phase ends and the prescribed path of play continues forever, leading to the payoff
profile υ, whence Pj’s deviation does not yield strictly greater payoff for Pj. If Pj deviates from the
prescribed path infinitely many times, let T0,T1,T2, . . . be the infinite sequence of stages where Pj
deviates. Then, for each n ∈ N, the payoff in the firstTn + (T 2n −Tn ) = T 2n stages (that is, at the end
of the nth punishment phase) is at most:
1
Tn + (T 2n −Tn)
(
Tn max
a∈A
{uj (a)} + (T 2n −Tn )µ j
)
=
(T 2n −Tn)µ j
T 2n
+
Tn maxa∈A{uj (a)}
T 2n
≤ µ j +O(1/n)
As the payoff of Pj is the limit inferior of the payoffs after the finite repetitions, the payoff for Pj
when deviating infinitely many times is at most µ j ≤ υj and hence Pj does not strictly increase
their payoff compared to s . Hence, as the finite history hT was arbitrary, s is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium.

